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Abstract
Focusing primarily on the disputes over Takeshima/Dokdo and the Senkaku 
Islands, this paper seeks to address how countries can cooperatively overcome 
territorial disputes in ways which create practical and fruitful arrangements (such 
as the establishment of a fishery zone in a disputed zone) while not escalating 
tensions or upsetting the diplomatic status quo. In conclusion, Japan’s practice of 
international cooperation concerning the territorial disputes in East Asia 
demonstrates: (1) diplomatic negotiation between the parties concerned can 
highlight the utility of attempting to overcome, rather than resolve, territorial issues 
or disputes; (2) international cooperation is certainly necessary to accomplish the 
aim of establish and maintain joint control of maritime zones around the disputed 
island in question; and (3) diplomacy, political consideration, wisdom, and a sense 
of compromise were decisive in the negotiation of each of these agreements and 
arrangements. 
Key words:  territorial and maritime disputes, Takeshima/Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyudao/
Tiaoyutai Islands, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), continental shelf
I. Introduction
Japan has three territorial disputes with neighbouring states: (1) with Russia over the 
Kuril Islands (or so-called Northern Territories), (2) with South Korea (Republic of Korea: 
ROK) over Takeshima/Dokdo, and (3) with China and Taiwan over the Senkaku/
Diaoyudao/Tiaoyutai Islands (See Figure 1).2 The position of the Japanese government, 
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which effectively occupies the Senkaku Islands, is that there is no dispute over the is-
lands. However, whereas Japan claims its right to territorial sovereignty regarding the 
Kuril Islands and Takeshima/Dokdo, the powers occupying these islands (Russia and 
ROK, respectively) deny the validity of these claims.3
Through diplomacy,4 these countries successfully established a maritime order in 
which all parties involved can, to a certain degree, enjoy and use the disputed areas. This 
successful practice hints at ways that countries can pragmatically bypass, rather than set-
tle, territorial disputes and share the fruit of subtle, cooperative arrangements.5 
Due to space constraints, this paper focuses primarily on the disputes over 
Takeshima/Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands. It analyses Japan’s practice of international 
maritime cooperation with the ROK, China, and Taiwan to establish a pragmatic, stable 
maritime order in the region in the face of territorial disputes.6 It seeks to address how 
countries can cooperatively overcome territorial disputes in ways which create practical 
and fruitful arrangements (such as the establishment of a fishery zone in a disputed zone) 
while not escalating tensions or upsetting the diplomatic status quo.7 
The following analysis will show how these countries have, under these tense dip-
lomatic circumstances, successfully created a framework for peaceful maritime relations 
through bilateral cooperation. 
Figure 1.  Japan’s Territorial Disputes with Neighbouring States
(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), ‘Japanese Territory’ 
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/territory/index.html> (accessed 9 April 
2020))
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II. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982 
and came into effect on 28 February 1996 for the ROK, 7 July 1996 for China, and 20 July 
1996 for Japan.8 Largely speaking, UNCLOS takes a zonal and a functional approach to 
the regulation and control of maritime spaces. The UNCLOS introduced a wide range of 
conditions regarding each country’s activity in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the 
continental shelf (CS) established by the Convention.9 
A functional approach to regulation and management utilises provisional measures 
and deals, flag state jurisdiction, self-restraint, and joint control by a joint committee of 
resources to manage these spaces. One provision of the UNCLOS prescribes the necessity 
of cooperation between the parties concerned regarding the delimitation of the EEZ and 
of the CS.10 Both Articles 74(3) and 83(3) bind signatory parties to ‘a spirit of understanding 
and co-operation…[p]ending agreement’ (emphasis added) regarding delimitation disputes 
on the EEZ and/or the CS.11 
III. Japan-ROK Relations
On 22 June 1965 Japan and the ROK signed the Treaty of Basic Relations Between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, which normalised their bilateral relationship. They also 
signed the Agreement on Fisheries, which entered into force on 18 December 1965 after a 
lengthy negotiation over the treatment of Takeshima/Dokdo due to its central position for 
fisheries in and around its maritime area. The main issue in this negotiation was how the 
countries could conclude a fishery treaty without affecting the sensitive issue of territori-
al sovereignty over the island. The 1965 Fisheries Agreement became a first step to pro-
mote a pragmatic way to overcome the territorial issue which has been at the centre of 
maritime issues between these two countries.12
Here, we review some specific, interesting features of the maritime arrangements in 
the context of bilateral maritime cooperation, whose coverage is the regulation and con-
trol of matters concerning fisheries, the continental shelf (CS), the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), and search and rescue (SAR), respectively.13 
1. On Fisheries 
Regarding the 1965 Fisheries Agreement, the following four are specific features which 
characterised its approach as pragmatic. First, the EEZ was established within 12 nautical 
miles from the baselines of each party’s coast. Second, based on the principle of jurisdic-
tion of flag state, each party may, under Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement, take 
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‘provisional fishery regulatory measures’ in the Joint Regulatory Zone (JRZ), outside of 
which, according to Article 5, a Joint Resource Research Zone (JRRZ) may be set. Third, a 
Joint Fishing Committee is established to jointly manage the fishing conducted in the rel-
evant zone by representatives of each country’s fisheries. Last, according to Article 9, 
each party is bound to settle disputes through diplomatic channels before going to 
arbitration.
2. On the Continental Shelf (CS)
To address the Continental Shelf (CS), the two countries signed a separate agreement 
̶the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Establishment 
of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries 
on 30 January 1974. It entered into force on 22 June 1978. This agreement adopted the me-
dian line as the demarcation line in the northern maritime space between the two parties. 
This achievement, temporary though, is noteworthy, because there was a disagreement 
between the parties concerning the method to delimit the continental shelf by the median 
line or in accordance with the doctrine of natural prolongation, which had been pro-
nounced by the ICJ’s judgment of 1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.14 
On the same date, the countries also concluded the Agreement between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the 
Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries. This agreement, which came into effect 
on the same date as the aforementioned Agreement on the Northern Part, established a 
Joint Development Zone (JDZ) in the maritime area which contained the overlapping 
claims of both parties, and saw both parties agree to practically shelve discussion of de-
limitation for the 50-year duration of the agreement (See Figure 2). 
Figure 2.  Relevant Maritime Zones under the Agreements be-
tween Japan and South Korea 
(Source: Akiyama, Masahiro, ‘Geopolitical Considerations 
of the Senkaku Islands’ (originally adapted from Shimada 
Yukio and Hayashi Moritaka, Kaiyo ho tekisutobukku [A 
Textbook on the Law of the Sea] (Tokyo: Yushindo, 2005)),
<https://www.spf.org/islandstudies/research/a00007.
html> (accessed 9 April 2020))
97
Japan’s Practice of International Cooperation: 
Overcoming Territorial and Maritime Disputes in East Asia
3. On the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
The Fisheries Agreement of 1965 was replaced by the Agreement on Fisheries between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea.15 The latter agreement was signed on 28 November 1998 
and entered into force on 22 January 1999, so that it would prevail over the former agree-
ment under the newly established fishery framework of the UNCLOS. It is noteworthy 
that then-Japanese Foreign Minister Komura issued a statement reiterating Japan’s offi-
cial legal position under the 1998 Fisheries Agreement in the following two terms:16
（1）‘The territorial issue was not shelved; it was separated’; and
（2） ‘[t]his agreement may not be construed as prejudicing the legal position of either 
country on any international law issue (not related to fishing) including the 
territorial issue over Takeshima.’
The 1998 Fisheries Agreement relied on the 1974 Agreements on the CS as prece-
dents to follow with respect to the delimitation of the relevant maritime areas. The 1998 
Agreement introduced the Provisional Demarcation Line for the Exercise of Sovereign 
Rights over Fishing Activities (or, Provisional Demarcation Line: PDL) ̶ a line which 
functioned as a de facto EEZ line but is not an EEZ under the UNCLOS. This PDL was 
the delimitation line of the Northern Part of the CS under the 1974 Northern Part 
Agreement. Moreover, the northern and southern ‘provisional zones’ were established in 
north and south of the PDL. Since there was no agreement on the delimitations of the 
EEZ, neither country can exclusively exercise sovereign rights over any fishing activities. 
To fill this gap in the stipulations of previous agreements, the 1998 Fisheries Agreement 
established a Joint Fishing Committee within these provisional zones to advise on the 
measures taken for conservation and management of marine living resources in the area. 
The 1998 Fisheries Agreement is based on the principle of reciprocity (Article 2) and a 
sense of cooperation not to be threatened by overexploitation (Annex I).17
This achievement was specifically mentioned positively in the 1998 Japan-republic 
of Korea Joint Declaration: a New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the 
Twenty-first Century, which acknowledges that a new bilateral fisheries agreement ‘had 
been a major outstanding issue between the two countries’.18
4. On Search and Rescue (SAR)
It is noteworthy in terms of a functional approach to the maritime area in question that 
both parties successfully achieved a diplomatic goal for the issue of search and rescue 
without touching a sensitive issue concerning territorial sovereignty. The Agreement be-
tween Japan and the Republic of Korea on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) and 
Emergency Refuge of Vessels was signed and came into force on 25 May 1990. The 
Agreement aims to provide ‘any person in distress at sea adjacent to the respective 
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countries’ with emergency refuge after search and rescue. Despite its objectives and pur-
poses, this Agreement has, without indicating the geographical scope of its application, a 




After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Japan normalised its diplomatic relation-
ship with Taiwan under the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China. This 
treaty was signed on 28 April 1952 and came into effect on 5 August 1952. On 29 September 
1972, however, Japan changed its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan by recognising the 
Beijing government as the sole and legitimate government of China under the Joint 
Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
Against this background, Japan and China, which did not have diplomatic relations 
between World War II and 1972, chose to conclude a non-governmental arrangement be-
tween the Japan-China Fishery Council (Nicchu Gyogyo Kyogikai 日中漁業協議会 ) and the 
China Fishery Association (Chugoku Gyogyo Kyokai 中国漁業協会 ) Concerning Fishery in 
the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. This arrangement was signed on 15 April 1955 
and came into effect on 13 June 1955. Since the Chinese side did not intend to extend this 
arrangement, a new arrangement was signed in November 1963 and came into effect in 
December of the same year. This second agreement was partially revised in December 
1965 and remained valid until 22 June 1974. 
Due to the territorial issue of the Senkaku/Diaouyu Islands, Japan and China con-
cluded the Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and China on 15 August 1975. This 
agreement came into force on 22 December 1975. It aimed to conserve and govern the 
reasonable use of fishery resources in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea under flag 
state jurisdiction. Under this agreement, which avoided including the maritime area 
(which is above 27 degrees north latitude) related to the territorial issue mentioned 
above, a Joint Fishery Committee was established (Article 6) to jointly control and man-
age fisheries resources in these maritime areas.19 
After the UNCLOS came into effect, Japan and China concluded the Agreement on 
Fisheries between Japan and the People’s Republic of China of 1997. This agreement was 
signed on 11 November 1997 and came into effect on 1 June 2000. It replaced the previous 
fisheries agreement and established a Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the East 
China Sea. Thus, without settling the huge debate over the issue of the applicable 
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principle for determining the demarcation line (i.e., either by the median line rule or the 
equitable principle in consideration to relevant factors), this agreement allowed both 
countries to continue peaceful economic activity in the East China Sea (See Figure 3).20 
The 1997 Fisheries Agreement has some specific features of interest. First, a Japan-
China Joint Committee is established (Articles 3 and 11) in order to jointly control and 
manage fisheries resources. Second, the coastal state will exercise its sovereign rights over 
marine living resources in its EEZ, except for the following two cases:
（1） The PMZ (Articles 6 and 7), where a decision of the Joint Committee prevails 
and where a unilateral action of either side is excluded; and 
（2） the area south of 27 degrees north latitude (where the disputed islands are 
located).
Second, however, it is noteworthy that the Exchange of Letters Concerning the Area 
Referred to in Subparagraph (b) of Article 6 of the 1997 Fisheries Agreement specifically 
mentions a significant point which determines how both countries can exercise their sov-
ereign rights in the following terms:21
‘[T]heir intentions not to apply their domestic laws concerning fishing activities 
Figure 3.  Relevant Maritime Zones of the 1997 Fisheries Agreement between 
Japan and China 
(Source: Fisheries Agency, ‘Kokusaitekina Shigen Kanri no Suishin ni 
tsuite’ [Promoting International Resources Management], 13 July 2016.
<https://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/kikaku/attach/pdf/61kikakubukai-3.
pdf> (Accessed 9 April 2020))
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to the nationals and fishing vessels of the other country in that area with the un-
derstanding that a cooperative relationship for the maintenance of marine living re-
sources exists between the two countries’ (emphasis added).
Third, the 1997 Fisheries Agreement has a disclaimer on the position of either party 
concerning any question related to the law of the sea, simply because Japan (whose posi-
tion is that there is no territorial issue over the islands) intended only to establish a fish-
ing order between the parties without any ‘direct relationship with the territorial title of 
the Islands in question’. Fourth, even though the 1997 Agreement mentions no specific 
dispute settlement procedures, it basically follows the spirit of the UNCLOS in that it de-
crees that the coastal state may exercise its sovereign rights over fishing activities and 
bears responsibility for the conservation and management of marine living resources. 
2. On Joint Development of Oil and Gas Fields
On 18 June 2008, the ‘Japan-China Joint Press Statement: Cooperation between Japan and 
China in the East China Sea’ was issued. This statement prescribes both parties’ commit-
ment to ‘cooperate without prejudice to the legal positions of both countries ... during the 
transitional period’ (emphasis added), though the length and meaning of this ‘period’ is 
not mentioned in the statement.22
This press statement is accompanied by the following two documents: (1) the 
Understanding on Joint Development in the East China Sea, under which the JDZ was des-
ignated for joint exploration of natural resources therein; and (2) the Understanding on the 
Development of Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Chinese) Oil and Gas Field, according to which the 
conclusion of the text was to be done at an early stage (See Figure 4). Despite this achieve-
ment, unfortunately, no actual progress has so far been announced from either party yet.
Figure 4.  Relevant Maritime Area of the 2008 Joint Press Statement
(Source: MOFA, Press Statement of 2008, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/
files/000091726.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2020))
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3. On Search and Rescue (SAR)
The Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China on Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR) and Emergency People’s Refuge of Vessels was signed on 26 October 
2018 and came into force on 14 February 2019. This agreement joined a series of a bilater-
al SAR agreements which Japan had concluded with the ROK, Russia, and the United 
States by 2019. Under this agreement, Japan’s Coast Guard and China’s Maritime Search 
and Rescue Centre are responsible for providing emergency refuge to vessels ‘irrespective 
of their nationality, status,’ (Article 2) and so forth. The Agreement is also accompanied 
by a disclaimer; it is ‘[n]ot prejudice to the present and future claim and legal opinion of 
the parties’ (Article 5 (2)).
4. On Maritime and Aerial Communication
On 9 May 2018, Japanese and Chinese defence authorities signed a memorandum on 
maritime and aerial communication. This memorandum aimed to promote mutual un-
derstanding and confidence, avert accidental clashes at sea and in the air, and prevent es-
calation of tensions. Arrangements are reportedly being made under way to open a 
hotline between the two countries’ defence officials. Although memorandum does not 
specify that it covers a given geographical area, it apparently intends to cover the mari-
time areas surrounding and adjacent to the islands in question. We can infer this from the 




After a dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands, severe conflict threatened the 
maritime order shared by Japan and Taiwan. In this light, the countries chose to sign the 
non-governmental Arrangement between the Interchange Association (Koeki zaidan hojin ko-
ryu kyokai 公益財団法人交流協会 ) and the Association of East Asian Relations (Ato kankei 
kyokai 亜東関係協会 ) Concerning the Creation of Fishery Order on 10 April 2013, which 
came into effect on the same day.24 
This Arrangement outlines the reasonable use of marine living resources in the EEZs 
and the maintenance of fishery order in the relevant maritime areas with the designation 
of an ‘exemption zone’ (horei tekiyo jogai suiiki 法令適用除外水域 ), where neither party ap-
plies its own laws on fishery to the other party, and a ‘special cooperation zone’ (tokubetsu 
kyoryoku suiiki 特別協力水域 ), where the conservation and reasonable use of marine living 
resources and the maintenance of fishery order are specially required to be established 
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(See Figure 5). This arrangement also founded a Fishery Committee to serve as a forum 
for discussions between Japanese and Taiwanese members concerning operational rules 
and measures, in order to protect and manage fishery resources and avoid any threat of 
overexploitation.25
Article 4 of this arrangement contains a disclaimer on the territorial issue. It refers 
to the character of the Arrangement without prejudice to the position of authorities of ei-
ther party concerning issues on the law of the sea. However, it has been reported that 
Japanese fishermen engaged in the relevant maritime areas are actually concerned about 
the adversarial impacts of this arrangement on their own interests due to the concession 
made by the Japanese side.26  
VI. Conclusions
This paper has identified the following five points in common between Japan’s efforts to 
jointly and diplomatically create maritime orders on multiple contested fronts which do 
not affect any party’s position regarding these territorial and maritime disputes (See 
Figure 6). 
Figure 5.  The Relevant Maritime Zones of the Non-Governmental Fisheries 
Arrangement between Japan and Taiwan
(Source: First and Second China and Mongolia Divisions, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ‘Saikin no Nittai Kankei to Taiwan Josei’ [The Recent 
Relations between Japan and Taiwan and State of Affairs in Taiwan], 
April 2014, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taiwan/pdfs/kankei.
pdf> (accessed 9 April 2020))
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First, no agreement is made on the delimitation of the maritime areas in question. 
Second, the introduction of a PMZ and/or a provisional line in the areas in question. 
Third, the establishment of a Joint Committee to manage and control the areas in ques-
tion. Fourth, cooperation between the parties concerned. Fifth and finally, the utilisation 
of a non-governmental arrangement, if necessary. It can be said that the use of these ele-
ments in combination demonstrates the pragmatic approach taken by the concerned par-
ties, each of whom wishes to continue using the contested areas without engaging or 
forcefully resolving the tensions over these areas.
It would be too early now to conclude that this practice in this region can be con-
strued as a result of historically, culturally, and/or geopolitically common sense. In con-
clusion, however, this paper makes the following three comments. 
First, the above-mentioned analysis illustrates the utility of attempting to overcome, 
rather than resolve, territorial issues or disputes. These disputes are difficult, if not impos-
sible, to totally resolve; therefore, these countries sought to shelve or bypass territorial dis-
putes in order to engage in friendly and mutually beneficial relations. In the cases 
mentioned above, each party shelved or separated the issues of territorial sovereignty and 
maritime delimitation in favour of pursuing peaceful and amicable relations. An institu-
tionally key element is the use of joint control and management of the area and resources 
in question by a Joint Committee under the spirit of self-restraint and cooperation.
Second, international cooperation is certainly necessary to accomplish the aim of es-
tablish and maintain joint control of maritime zones around the disputed island in ques-
tion. The objectives and purposes of the UNCLOS suggest that provisional arrangements 
Figure 6. Summary Table of the Discussions above (Made by the author)
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may be used pending a final solution in a spirit of understanding and cooperation be-
tween the parties concerned. This cooperation may be global under the UNCLOS, and re-
gional or bilateral (or, as the case may be, multi-lateral) in accordance with the relevant 
circumstances.
Third, diplomacy, political consideration, wisdom, and a sense of compromise were 
decisive in the negotiation of each of these agreements and arrangements. These elements 
need to be present among governments, law makers, and nationals in brokering of these 
arrangements. It is of interest, therefore, that one of the most essential things against the 
backdrop of each case is, in the long run, a timing in a certain favourable environment, 
which will be normally realised by the parties concerned retrospectively. 
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